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Abstract 
This paper presents evidence on the spillover effect associated with the support received by 
firms located in a City of Argentina, between 2003 and 2007. The rationale for the cluster 
development program was the presence of agglomeration economies and coordination 
failures that generated spillovers and therefore to a suboptimal allocation of resources. We 
use a panel of firms in the ICT sector for the period 2003-2011 that allowed us to control for 
the dynamics of firms’ sales and fixed-effect applying the System GMM estimator. We find 
that one additional participant in the program increases the sales of non-participants in the 
City of Córdoba by 0.7%. 
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1. Introduction 
Governments in several countries are increasingly implementing public programs to support 
clusters with the objective of increasing productivity, increasing jobs, or developing certain 
industries. However, there is a strong debate on whether and how governments should 
support private firms (Crespi et al 2014). On the one hand, there are views resistant to public 
policy promotion of specific industries. These views argue for neutral interventions, and 
therefore propose horizontal policies in which firms of different sectors or regions can be 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, there are views proposing selectivity in the sectors to be 
supported. Cluster development programs are by nature sectoral and regional specific. 
Therefore they are supported only for those who stand for more selectivity. The economic 
rationality for these types of programs is the presence of agglomeration economies and 
coordination failures (Becattini 1989, Porter 1990, and Giuliani 2005) that lead to a 
suboptimal allocation of resources. Agglomeration economies, first documented in the work 
of Marshall (1920), are the result of a set of external positive factors emerging from the 
proximity between firms (Arrow 1962, Romer 1986, and Glaeser et al. 1992). Under the 
presence of these externalities, investment decisions are related each other and the investment 
of one firm may have a positive effect on the investment profitability of other firms 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943).   The empirical literature on agglomeration economies began in 
the 1970s with the contributions of Shefer (1973) and Sveikauskas (1975). However, the 
work by Ciccone and Hall (1996) was the first to address the intrinsic endogeneity—i,e,  do 
firms benefit from agglomeration because of externalities, or do rather the most successful 
and productive firms decide to locate close to other firms? According to their findings 
doubling the employment density increases average labor productivity by around 6 percent in 
United States gross state output. Other papers presenting evidence of agglomeration 
economies include Ellison and Glaeser (1997), Hanson (2001), Dumais et al. (2002), 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Rodríguez-Clare (2005, 2007), Combes et al. (2010, 2011), 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Rizov et al. (2012) and Moretti (2014). 
The lack of agreement between the views in favor or against policies that select some sectors 
is in part due to the lack of rigorous impact evaluations of these policies. A non-exhaustive 
list of evaluations of productive development programs in Latin America includes Binelli and 
Maffioli (2007), Crespi et al (2011), Volpe et al (2011), Eslava et al. (2012a and 2012b), 
Figal et al (2012), Arráiz et al. (2013), Castillo et al. (2013), Arráiz et al. (2014), and Castillo 
et al (2014). Although these studies filled important knowledge gaps in several directions, 
most of them have focused on horizontal policies and on the benefits received by direct 
beneficiaries. Unfortunately, there are few papers addressing the effect on firms that do not 
participate in the programs, but might still obtain benefits through externalities generated by 
these programs. This is an important gap considering that many of these policies are often 
justified by the presence of such externalities or spillovers. The few exceptions are Figal et al. 
(2012) who assessed the impact of the support program to Arranjos Produtivos Locais (APL) 
in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais in Brazil, and Castillo et al. (2014) who studied the effect of 
the innovation support program FONTAR in Argentina. These studies evaluated the effect of 
the programs both on direct and indirect beneficiaries. They considered different mechanisms 
to identify indirect beneficiaries. The former identified indirect beneficiaries as those firms 
that did not participate in the activities of the program, but were benefitted by being located 
in the same geographic area and produce in the same industry as the direct beneficiary firms. 
The second study identified indirect beneficiaries as those non-participant firms that hired 
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skilled workers previously employed in a firm that participated in the program and therefore 
were able to transfer the knowledge provided by the program.  
This paper aims at contributing to the literature by providing evidence on both a non-
horizontal program and the spillover it created. The program was part of the Development 
Program of Productive Chains in the Province of Córdoba that occurred between 2003 and 
2007. The program aimed at improving ICT firms’ performance by financing up to 50% of 
joint projects prepared by ICT firms in the City of Córdoba.  Joint projects generated local 
externalities that also benefited ICT non-participant firms in the City of Córdoba. For 
example, one of the joint projects was a purchasing pool to reduce costs.  Participant firms 
reduced their cost and also sold inputs to non-participant.  Similarly, the reputation gained by 
participants was freely shared to non-participants in the City of Cordoba because costumers 
identified ICT firms in Cordoba and not only those that participated in the program.   
We use two databases in the empirical analysis: (i) the administrative records of the program, 
resulting from the monitoring activities carried out by the implementing agency and  (ii) tax 
records, provided by the Statistics and Census Office of the Province of Córdoba, that 
provide us with sales information about every firm in the Province of Córdoba.  The final 
dataset is an unbalanced panel of firms that allowed us to estimate the spillover effects 
controlling by fixed-effects and the previous dynamics of sales. 
Our results indicate that the program was effective not only increasing the sales of the firms 
that actively participated in the program but also in increasing the sales of non-participant 
firms that received spillovers. In fact, we find that one additional participant increased the 
sales of non-participant ICT firms located in the City of Córdoba compared to other firms not 
located in the City of Córdoba by 0.7%.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion about 
Cluster Development Programs (CDP) and their rationale. Section 3 presents a detailed 
description of the policy program in the City of Córdoba. Section 4 discusses the 
identification strategy. This section presents the dataset used in the evaluation and the 
econometric methods applied to identify the spillover effects. Sections 5 and 6 present the 
empirical results and a robustness analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. The rationale of Cluster Development Programs 
The definition of clusters is challenging in itself and several definitions have been proposed 
over time (Martin and Sunley 2003). A baseline definition interprets an industrial cluster to 
be a geographic group of interconnected firms and associated organizations specialized in the 
same or related production activities. This agglomeration generate industry- and location-
specific externalities that range from the exchange of information and technological spillover 
improving innovation as a result of formal and informal networks among them and with their 
associated organizations, to the creation of a local labor market where appropriate skills can 
be found and contracted. 
The network and linkages are in the core of industrial clusters.  These linkages increase 
personal networking, facilitate repeated interactions that in turn may modify the terms of the 
exchange, facilitate knowledge transfer, facilitate organizational learning and act as a locus of 
innovation, strengthen the effects of economies of scale, facilitate the generation of public 
goods (Lundvall, 1988 and 1992). 
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Linkages evolve over time and ex-ante expectations of opportunistic behavior by the agents 
may change into mutual trust as agents accumulate experience and are embedded in a specific 
social context (Nooteboom 1992). The emergence of mutual trust among members is likely to 
considerably reduce transaction costs and improve the benefits of linkages.  This mutual trust 
is more likely to occur within closely located firms where entrepreneurs can meet and 
develop informal linkages.  
In addition to the strengthening of linkages, sharing a specific location also helps firms to hire 
workers trained in specific skills relevant to the industry. In fact, labor pooling generates 
externalities because the concentration of an industry in a certain location allows workers to 
specialize in industry-specific skills without the fearing of not finding a job that matches 
those skills in their area of residence. Moreover, the effect of agglomeration economies is 
also dynamic (Rodriguez-Clare 2005). For example, the concentration of specialized workers 
also increases the concentration of firms that aim at hiring workers with specific skills. 
Similarly, the interaction between firms encourages a higher rate of productivity growth 
which in turn facilitate a more intense and effective process of innovation and new 
interactions.  
Although many linkages between firms already exist, they are often not sufficiently 
structured and firms fail to exploit their full potential beyond the realization of market 
transactions. In other cases, firms fail to set up linkages themselves or the linkages are not of 
the quality required to fulfill their potential. A number of factors, such as asymmetric 
information, may affect this failure.  
In light of the benefits of effective business linkages and the externalities they create, many 
countries have been implementing policies and programs that aim at strengthening and 
improving these linkages and make them more beneficial and virtuous.  
Several studies provide evidence of positive agglomeration economies. The empirical 
literature on agglomeration economies began in the 1970s with the contributions of Shefer 
(1973) and Sveikauskas (1975). However, the work by Ciccone and Hall (1996) was the first 
to address the intrinsic endogeneity in clusters. According to Ciccone and Hall (1996) a 
doubling of employment density increases average labor productivity by around 6 percent in 
United States gross state output. 
The second rationale for CDPs is the presence of coordination failures that hamper the 
development of some industries in specific localities.  Coordination failures are a widespread 
and a well-known problem in development economics that may lead to a remarkably 
suboptimal allocation of resources if not properly addressed by policy interventions. 
Production development is not alien to this problem and investment could strongly be 
affected by poor coordination. As pointed out by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), coordination 
failures emerge in the presence of externalities that make the investment decision of one 
agent interrelated to those of others. In the case of productive investment, the investment of 
one firm can have positive effects on the profitability of the investment of another firm to the 
point that without the former the latter would not be economically viable.  
Solving coordination failures is one of the key objectives of cluster development programs. 
These interventions create formal and informal institutional frameworks to facilitate private-
private, public-private and public-public collaboration. To induce more collective action 
among private firms in a cluster programs often strengthen a local business association or 
help creating a new one or a new “cluster association” that firms may join as the common 
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interest of firms in a that cluster may not coincide with existing sectorial-type business 
chambers. 
Hence, the existence of information asymmetries, externalities and coordination failures 
represent the guiding principles and justification for CDPs that aim at strengthening linkages 
and improving their quality.  
3. The Information and Communications Technology CDP in the City 
of Córdoba  
Between 1998 and 2002 Argentina’s economy plunged into a recession. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fell 12 percent from 1998 to 2002, private investment was reduced by 32 
percent, and at the beginning of 2002 industrial production was 18 percent lower than in the 
same period of 2001. The greatest impact was suffered by small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). In this context, the Province of Córdoba—with the support of the Multilateral 
Investment Fund, BID-FOMIN—designed the Productive Chains Development Program with 
a budget of 1.9 million of dollars.  
The program was based on a study aimed at selecting specific sectors that, due to their 
current characteristics and future perspectives, could take advantage from a program aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of SMEs in those sectors. The selected clusters were the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in City of Córdoba, the furniture 
production in Rio Segundo and Calamuchita, and the regional goods production in the 
northwest of the province. In the rest of the paper we focus our attention in the ICT cluster. 
The City of Córdoba had important advantages for the development of the ICT cluster. These 
advantages included: access to every market in the country; the presence of air and land 
logistic services; adequate provision of electricity, natural gas, water, sewer services, 
telephone and Internet; as well as other elements that contribute to the infrastructure required 
by the industry. In addition, the city held a pool of highly educated labor, with 12 graduate 
programs in engineering, two of which were directly related to electronics and 
telecommunication. Citywide, there were close to 120,000 university students. 
In 2002, the ICT cluster was formed by a group of more than 20 firms that adopted the name 
of the Cluster Córdoba Technology (CTC). The main objective of the cluster was the 
promotion of the development of new products and applications, as well as a concerted effort 
to integrate with international markets.  In addition, a group of 37 firms and a university 
formed the Chamber of Computer, Electronic and Communications of Central Argentina 
(Cámara de Industrias Informáticas, Electrónicas y de Comunicaciones del Centro de 
Argentina, or CIIECCA). In addition to these groups of organized firms, there were close to 
60—mostly informal—micro firms dedicated to software design. In several cases, they used 
to be suppliers of the other firms. 
The program was implemented between July 2003 and October 2007 with the objective of 
increasing the firms’ competitiveness.  To reach this objective, the program strengthened the 
cooperation between firms and between firms and institutions to enhance and consolidate 
social capital, supported the access to productive and organizational technologies, and 
supported access to markets.  
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To participate in the program firms belonging to the ICT sector in City of Córdoba applied 
for the support by presenting a joint project. Joint projects included the application for credit 
with special conditions, the investment in capital goods, or strategic and logistic organization 
in the search for new markets. An important example of the cluster actions was the creation 
of a purchase pool of inputs that allowed firms to considerable reduce their costs.  In fact, 
purchasing pool bought higher quantities at lower prices that allowed participating firms 
benefited from lower price of inputs. The purchasing pool also allowed to participating firms 
to sell inputs to non-participant at lower prices.  This is a clear example of the coordination 
gains for the participants and also an example of spillovers to non-participant.  Another 
example of the coordination benefits was the acquisition of quality certificates. The program 
allowed the access to quality certificates that could not have been obtained individually by 
each firm because they implied an investment too large for small and medium enterprises. An 
evaluation committee studied the proposal, and in case of being approved, the program co-
financed the project. On average, projects were co-financed by 50 percent. The group 
coordinator, a businessperson elected by the firms, played a key role facilitating the 
communication between the evaluating committee and the firms. S/he helped to keep the 
group organized and prevented owners or firms’ representatives from overburdened by 
administrative work in detriment of the tasks of their own enterprises.  
The Program financed 35 joint activities in the cluster for an amount higher than USD 1.9 
million. Each activity involved at least two firms. More than half of the activities were below 
USD 10,000. However, there were activities with a cost above USD 100,000.  In terms of the 
type of activities, the support for the access to productive and organizational technologies 
concentrated 67% of the resources, see Table 1. The program supported 83 SMEs from the 
ICT cluster between 2003 and 2007.  The entry of firms into the program was sequential. The 
number of firms that received some support per year was 34, 17, 35 and 2 in 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
Table 1: Activities supported by the program 
Activities Number of activities USD 
Strengthening cooperation, through: 
(i) Promotion of the formation of human resources on issues related to 
business cooperation. 
(ii) Identification of obstacles inhibiting firm and sector competitiveness.  
(iii) Increased awareness about the benefits of developing collective 
activities.  
(iv) Identification of services that need cooperation with universities and 
other specialized institutions.  
(v) Established mechanisms for the joint search of financial resources. 
(vi) Sharing experience between the firms in the cluster. 
 
6 456,000 
Access to productive and organizational technologies, through  
(i) Diagnosis of common problems in technology and production 
organization. 
(ii) Identification and recruitment of consultants able to respond to the needs 
identified in their diagnoses.  
(iii) Implementation of joint projects in order to improve the performance.  
(iv) Production of new technologies and management practices. 
 
9 1,300,000 
Access to markets, through the promotion of technical assistance aimed at:  
(i) Identifying new markets and niches in order to expand sales 
opportunities, both national and international. 
20 190,000 
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(ii) Adjusting the quality and design of products and services.  
(iii) Training sales and marketing managers. 
 
Total 35 1,900,000 
Source: Authors elaboration with ADEC data.  
4. Identification strategy 
As mentioned above, the main rationale of cluster development programs is the presence of 
coordination failures and agglomeration economies that generate externalities—spillovers—
and therefore leads to a suboptimal allocation of resources. When the externalities are 
positive, as it is expected from coordination failures and agglomeration economies, firms’ 
investment is lower than the optimum level because investors only consider their own 
benefits when they take the investment decision. To measure these externalities, we estimate 
the effect of the program on non-participant firms which receive the benefits of the program 
due to their linkages to participant—we call these firms the indirect beneficiaries of the 
program. The indirect effect is usually ignored in evaluation studies by implicitly assuming 
that the effect on non-participants is zero. Therefore, this is the main contribution of our 
paper. 
ICT firms located in the City of Córdoba have linkages that generate spillovers from the 
participant to the non-participant firms. In fact, the ICT sector is a knowledge intensive sector 
and in many of the owners or managers of ICT firms actively participate in universities where 
there is knowledge sharing with other ICT firms. An additional channel of spillovers in the 
case of the ICT cluster in City of Córdoba is the purchasing pool that was constructed that 
lowered prices not only for the participants. Although the purchasing pool was not 
exclusively for firms located in the City of Cordoba those firms were more likely to benefit 
due to transaction costs—information about its existence, trust or transport costs. Finally, 
another source of spillovers is the reputation that participants gained in international markets 
and freely shared with non-participants in the City of Cordoba. Therefore, given that firms 
located in the City of Cordoba in the ICT sector are those with a higher probability of 
receiving spillovers, we consider them as indirect beneficiaries. 
To identify the spillover effect of the program is crucial to understand what would be the 
value of sales of indirect beneficiaries if they do not receive the spillovers.  This value is a 
counterfactual that cannot be directly observed. Indeed, this is in fact the crucial problem in 
causal inference (Angrist and Pischke 2009). To estimate this counterfactual it is necessary a 
group of firms that in average would have the same value of sales as the indirect beneficiaries 
should they have not received the spillover—i.e. a control group.   
The firms in control group need to fulfill two conditions. First, it is necessary that they do not 
participate in the program or receive spillovers.  Therefore, we include those firms outside the 
City of Cordoba in the control group. In addition, given that part of the knowledge transfer 
occurs in universities, we select only those the cities in the Province of Córdoba with 
universities or branches of the universities in the City of Córdoba. These cities are Río 
Cuarto, Villa María, San Francisco, Marco Juarez, Bell Ville, and Villa Dolores. Second, it is 
necessary that in absence of the program firms the control group would have the same sales 
than firms receiving the spillovers.  We will discuss this condition in detail in section 4.b.   
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a. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use data from two different sources: (i) the administrative records of the program, and (ii) 
data collected by the Tax Bureau of the Province of Córdoba and managed for statistical 
purposes by the Statistics Bureau of the Córdoba Province (DGEC). DGEC data provided us 
with an annual panel for the period 2003-2011. This dataset includes the population of 
manufactures and services producers from the Province of Córdoba. While this dataset 
contains information about geographic location, age, the main product, and sales, the 
administrative records of the program provided us with information on the date firms 
received the support and the type of support received by them.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables per firm location. Although 
most of the ICT activity occurs in the City of Córdoba, there are firms outside City of 
Córdoba that potentially can be used as a comparison group for the beneficiaries of the 
cluster activities. The only ICT industry with no activity outside the City of Córdoba is the 
Manufacture of computers, radios, television, and communication devices. Because of this 
reason we excluded this sector of our analysis.  Given that there are only 3 participant and 11 
non-participant firms in the City of Córdoba corresponding to this sector, this exclusion of 
was not a major problem for our study.  Therefore we restricted the analysis to firms 
producing hardware or software industries classified as International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (CIIU) 31, 33, and 72. We were able to match 38 
participants in the City of Córdoba in these industries.7 The second column presents 
information about the 515 ICT firms located in the City of Córdoba that received the 
spillovers—i.e. the indirect beneficiaries.  Finally, the third group corresponds to the 102 ICT 
firms located outside of the City of Córdoba that will serve as a control group for the indirect 
beneficiaries.  Therefore, final dataset is an unbalanced panel with 655 firms. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Participants(1) 
(All of them were 
located in the City 
of Córdoba) 
Non-participants 
Located in the City 
of Córdoba: 
Indirect 
beneficiaries 
Located in other 
cities(2) in the 
Province of 
Córdoba: 
Control firms 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D 
Number of firms 38(3) 515 102 
Average number of observations per firm 8.4 5.5 6.0 
Manufacture of machinery and electrical devices (4) 0.478 0.500 0.438 0.496 0.393 0.489 
Computer services and related activities(5)  0.522 0.500 0.562 0.496 0.607 0.489 
Age 8.15 6.52 5.47 7.35 6.57 6.26 
                                                 
7 The program provided support to 88 firms. However, it was possible to match only 42 of those firms and 4 of 
them were not in the City of Cordoba—one was in Villa Maria and the rest in other provinces.  There are two 
reasons that can explain why it was not possible to identify the other 46 firms. First, they might be in a 
simplified tax regime for small firms that do not declare sales for taxes.  Second, they might be declaring other 
industries as their main industry.  This is not a major problem for our study.  First, our main focus is on the 
indirect beneficiaries not on the participants. Second, even if firms in the simplified regime are not in our 
dataset, this is valid both for the participant and non-participants. Finally, we are interested only in the ICT 
sector. 
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Annual Sales (thousands of Pesos) 2,839 4,235 989 2,919 596 1,296 
Annual Sales Growth 0.312 3.07 0.237 2.13 0.245 1.88 
 Notes: (1)  There are 3 participants classified in CIIU 32 (Manufacture of computers, radios, television, and communications devices) that 
were not included in the analysis because there are no firms in other cities different from City of Córdoba. (2) Other cities include Río 
Cuarto, Villa María, San Francisco, Marco Juarez, and Bell Ville. (3) These are the participants that were matched to the DGEC in the two 
industries used in the analysis. (4) CIIU 31 and 33. (5) CIIU 72. 
 
Table 2 shows that direct beneficiaries were larger and after they participated in the program 
increased sales at growing rates.  In fact, the average annual growth of sales for the period 
2003-2011 was 31%.   
The comparability of indirect beneficiaries to control group can be observed from Table 2. In 
fact, it is possible to observe the same proportion of software and hardware firms in the City 
of Córdoba and in the rest of cities. Both non-participant in the City of Cordoba and non-
participant in the rest of cities have approximately the same age, being the firms in the City of 
Cordoba one year younger than the firms in the rest of cities—5.47 years in City of Córdoba 
and 6.57 in the reset of cities.  The structure of the panel is similar for the two groups of 
firms; in fact, we have information for approximately the same number of years—we have on 
average 5.5 years of information about non-participants in City of Córdoba and 6 years in the 
rest of cities. Finally, although indirect beneficiaries were larger, they grew on average at 
similar rate than firms in other cities—annual average of 23.7% for the firms in the City of 
Córdoba and 24.5%. Although that average is slightly lower for the firms in the City of 
Córdoba, this is not a signal of the absence of spillovers.  In fact, given that they are on 
average larger and one year older, it is possible to expect lower rates. However, conditional 
on size and age, they could have larger growth.  In fact, this is part of what we test in the 
empirical results.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average real sales—nominal sales deflated using the GDP 
deflator—for the participant firms in the City of Córdoba, non-participant in the City of 
Córdoba, and non-participant in other cities.  This figure confirms that participants grew at 
higher rates than non-participants.  In addition, the difference was large enough to be evident 
in the average value even when participants were larger and older and therefore with a lower 
growth profile. 
Figure 1: The evolution of real sales of ICT firms 
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 Notes: Nominal sales deflated using the GDP deflator. Other cities include: Rio Cuarto, Villa María, San 
Francisco, Marcos Juarez, Bell Ville, y Villa Dolores.   
 
b. Econometric strategy 
As we mention above, in a counterfactual scenario in which there are no spillovers, firms in 
the control group should have the same evolution of sales than indirect beneficiaries that 
receive the spillover effects.  If the spillovers were randomly distributed across the firms in 
the Province of Córdoba, then the simple comparison of average sales growth would provide 
the effect of the spillover.  However, even if the indirect beneficiaries did not apply to obtain 
the spillovers—the most common source of selection bias in the policy evaluation 
literature—they could be different than the firms in our control group because of two other 
reasons.  First, firms in the City of Córdoba can take advantage of better infrastructure and 
business environment than firms in the rest of cities—this is valid even after selecting large 
cities with universities.  Second, as a consequence of this better environment, firms in the 
City of Córdoba could also have better performance even without the spillover they receive.  
The panel structure of our dataset allows us to tackle these two sources of bias.  One 
estimator that it is usually used in the evaluation of productive development programs when 
there is panel data available is the fixed-effect estimator—see, for example, Arráiz et al 
(2013), Castillo et al. (2013), Arráiz et al. (2014), Castillo et al. (2014). This estimator works 
well when the selection into the program is due to unobserved variables.  In our case, this 
estimator would help us to control for the effect of unobserved time invariant characteristics 
that could explain different evolution of sales between firms in the City of Córdoba and the 
rest of cities. For example, given that we do not expect large changes in infrastructure during 
the period of analysis, this estimator allow us to control for the effect of infrastructure.  In 
fact this estimator not only allows us to control for the effect of infrastructure but also for any 
unobserved time invariant firm characteristic. For example, the size of the firm in 2003 
before they receive the spillover, the type of society, the experience of the entrepreneur 
before joining or creating the firm, or the ability of the entrepreneur.   
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Let ܤ௧ be the total number of participants in the program and therefore the source of spillover effects, then the identification strategy requires that the expected value of sales of firm i in 
period t in the case where there is no spillovers, ଴ܻ௜௧, conditional to other firm characteristics, 
௜ܺ௧, like the age of the firm and the type of product, and the unobservable firm-level time invariant characteristics, ߤ௜, to be independent of the number of participants and therefore to be independent of the spillovers; i.e. ܧሺ ଴ܻ௜௧|, ௜ܺ௧, ߤ௜, ܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൌ ܧሺ ଴ܻ௜௧| ௜ܺ௧, ߤ௜ሻ.8  The estimating equation in this case is given by 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ߜܤ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ 	ߤ௧ ൅	ߤ௜ ൅	ߝ௜,௧      (1) 
where Yi,t is the log of real sales and ߤ௧ is a set of dummies that control for non-observed time varying factors that affect all firms in the same vain—for example, the economic growth or 
the inflation rate of the economy.9    
If indirect beneficiaries have higher growth rate even in absence of spillovers, then equation 
(1) would produce (upward) biased estimates of the spillover effects.  If this is the case, to 
identify the spillover effects it is necessary to control for the previous values of sales.  The 
identification condition in this case is that the expected value of sales of firm i in period t in 
the case where there is no spillovers, ଴ܻ௜௧, conditional to other firm characteristics, ௜ܺ௧, and the lagged values of sales to be independent of the number of participants and therefore to be 
independent of the spillovers; i.e. ܧሺ ଴ܻ௜௧| ௜ܺ௧, ௜ܻ௧ିଵ, ܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൌ ܧሺ ଴ܻ௜௧| ௜ܺ௧, ௜ܻ௧ିଵሻ.  The estimating equation in this case is given by 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ߜܤ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ 	ߤ௧ ൅	ߝ௜,௧.      (2) 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that if the correct identification assumption is the one used 
in equation (1), estimating equation (2) provides a lower value of the true effect.  On the 
other hand, if the correct specification is the one used in equation (2), the estimation of 
equation (1) will produce a value larger than the true coefficient.   
The fact that under incorrect specification equations (1) and (2) provide limits for the true 
value of the spillover effect is very useful.  In fact, it is possible to control for both the fixed-
effect and the previous evolution of sales.  In this case, the identification assumption  that the 
expected value of sales of firm i in period t in the case where there is no spillovers, ଴ܻ௜௧, conditional to other firm characteristics, ௜ܺ௧, the unobservable firm-level time invariant characteristics, ߤ௜, and the lagged values of sales to be independent of the number of participants and therefore to be independent of the spillovers; i.e. 
ܧሺ ଴ܻ௜௧|, ௜ܺ௧, ௜ܻ௧ିଵ, ߤ௜, ܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൌ ܧሺ ଴ܻ௜௧| ௜ܺ௧, ௜ܻ௧ିଵ, ߤ௜, ሻ.  The estimating equation in this case is given by 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ߙ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߜܤ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅	ߤ௧ ൅	ߤ௜ ൅	ߝ௜,௧.     (3) 
Under the assumptions described above, the estimation of equations (1), (2), and (3) is 
straightforward. Equation (1) can be estimated using the Within-Groups (WG) estimator, 
                                                 
8 We use the lag of the number of direct beneficiaries because we do not expect a contemporary spillover effect.  
9 It is possible to prove that controlling for this set of dummies is equivalent to deflating the value of sales by a 
price index for the ICT sector.  Let PICT the price index of the ICT sector, then the real value of sales of firm i in period t is salesit/PICT,t . Taking logs we have Yit = log(salesit) – log(PICTt), which is the variable in the left-hand side of (1). Note that log(PICTt) does not vary at the firm level. Then adding log(PICTt) in both sides of equation 
(1), the value of log(PICTt) is controlled by ߤ௧. 
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equation (2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and equation (3) using the System GMM 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (2000).  To estimate equation (3) it is also possible to use the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) difference estimator. However, we use the System GMM because 
the persistence of sales is large and Blundell and Bond (2000) shows that in those cases there 
is weak correlation between the level of sales and the difference in sales.  Colombo et al 
(2013) used a similar framework to study the effect of public subsidies on the employment 
growth of new technology-based firms in Italy. 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the spillover effects obtained in each equation. We first 
present equation (2) because, as we mentioned above, if the model is misspecified, this 
equation will provide a lower value for the spillover effect; this lower value is 0.004, 
statistically significant at 1%. The second column shows the estimates of equation (1). If the 
correct identification assumption is the one related to the dynamics of sales rather fixed-
effects, the estimated coefficient has an upward bias and provides an upper limit for the 
actual value of the spillover effect. The value of the spillover effect in this case is 0.056, 
statistically significant at 1%. Finally, the third column presents the estimates of equation (3) 
using the System GMM estimator. 10 The table also shows the Arellano–Bond test for first, 
second and third-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. When the idiosyncratic 
errors are iid, the first-differenced errors are first-order serially correlated. However, if the 
model is well specified, there should not be autocorrelation of order superior than one; see 
Holtz-Eakin et at. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). In addition, the table also presents 
Sargan test; under the null hypothesis the model is overidentified. Therefore, a rejection of 
this null hypothesis would imply reconsidering the model or instruments; see Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The System GMM estimate controls for both fixed-effects and lagged 
dependent variable and therefore is estimated under the correct identifying assumptions. As 
expected, the value of the coefficient is between the previous estimates.  
Table 3: Estimation of the spillover effect 
  Eq. (2) - OLS Eq. (1) - FE Eq. (3) - SGMM 
B t-1 (Number of participants) 0.004*** 0.056*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
Log sales t-1 0.879*** - 0.236*** 
(0.021) (0.075) 
Age and Age squared Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test (p-value) 45.90 (0.150) 
Autocorrelation of order 1 (p-value) -3.793 (0.000) 
Autocorrelation of order 2 (p-value) 1.255 (0.209) 
                                                 
10 The instruments we used in order to run the System GMM are the logarithm of sales from lag 2 onward for 
the equation in differences and the logarithm of sales with lag 7 for the level equation, in addition we consider 
as a general instruments the lagged value of the age and its squared, dummies variables associated with the 
industry heterogeneity, year and the interaction of them. 
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Autocorrelation of order 3 (p-value) -0.688 (0.492) 
Number of observations 2619 3259 2619 
Number of firms 617 617 617 
Instruments   47 
R square 0.78 0.31 -- 
Notes: (i) Robust standard errors in brackets. (ii) ***, **, * statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
The value of the coefficient estimated using System GMM is equal to 0.009, statistically 
significant at 1%. The coefficient can be interpreted as follows: one additional participant 
increases the sales of non-participants in the City of Córdoba by 0.9% on average in a year. 
Both the the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests and the Sargan test provides evidence of 
that the model is well specified.  
6. Robustness checks 
Table 3 controls for time-varying unobservable factors that affect all the firms in the same 
vein. In this section, we relax the assumption controlling for time-varying unobservable 
factors that might affect differently to firms in the software industry to those firms in the 
hardware industries. For example, this is the case if we use different deflator for each 
industry or different trend in growth between these industries. To control for these factors we 
include the interaction between the two industry dummies and the year dummies. 
Table 4 shows the results of this estimation. Once again, the spillover effect is positive and 
statistically significant. As mentioned, equations (2) and (1) provide the lower and upper 
limits for the true parameter obtained in equation (3).  
The value of the coefficient is slightly lower that in Table 3. In fact, is only 0.002 lower than 
in Table 3 and it is also statistically significant at 1%. This estimate implies that an additional 
participant increases the sales of indirect beneficiaries in 0.7%. The specification tests for the 
System GMM estimates also provide evidence of a well specified model.  
Table 5: Estimation of the spillover effect. Robustness check 
  Eq. (2) - OLS Eq. (1) - FE Eq. (3) - SGMM 
Bt-1 (Number of participants) 0.004* 0.059*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) 
Log sales t-1 0.880*** - 0.310*** 
(0.021) (0.072) 
    
Age and Age squared Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test 21.559 (0.307) 
Autocorrelation of order 1 (p-value) -4.143 (0.000) 
Autocorrelation test. Order 2 (p-value) 1.380 (0.168) 
Autocorrelation test. Order 3 (p-value) -0.701 (0.481) 
Number of observations 2619 3259 2619 
Number of firms 617 617 617 
Instruments   36 
R square 0.777 0.314 -- 
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Notes: (i) Robust standard errors in brackets. (ii) ***, **, * statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
7. Conclusions  
This paper estimates the spillover effect of the support received by ICT firms in the City of 
Córdoba under a Cluster Development Program implemented between 2003 and 2007. The 
program financed on average 50 percent of joint projects that helped to easy coordination 
failures and generated externalities. The spillovers were industry and location specific and 
therefore we defined as indirect beneficiaries to those firms in the ICT sector located in the 
City of Córdoba and compared them to ICT firms in other cities. Our results provide strong 
evidence on the existence of spillover effects. In fact, our estimates show that one additional 
participant in the program can generate spillovers that increase the sales of non-participant in 
the City of Córdoba by 0.9%. 
We used data from the administrative records of the program and DGEC that allowed us to 
construct a panel of firms from 2003-2011.  This dataset allowed us to use the panel structure 
to identify the spillover effects.  Given that the value of sales of firms in the City of Córdoba 
compared to firms in other cities could change due to the different infrastructure and this 
different infrastructure could in fact imply differences in the growth of sales even before the 
firm receive the spillovers, we use the System GMM estimator that allows us to control for 
firm level unobserved time invariant characteristics and the lagged value of sales.  
Our results have three important policy implications. First, they provide rigorous evidence 
about the existence spillover effects and therefore about the main rationale of cluster 
development programs. Second, they suggest that a larger program with more participant 
firms can lead to higher sales for other non-participant firms. These implications are linked. 
In fact, is the spillovers are not included in the design and ex-ante cost benefit analysis it is 
likely to have an under sized program. Third, an important implication is the type of data that 
needs to be collected during the implementation of the program.  We were able to do the 
analysis because the program collected monitoring data on who participated in the program, 
in which activities, when, and how much received, and because we were able to use 
secondary data on sales. Although sales was in the core of the program objective, it would be 
also interesting to see the effect on other variables like employment, exports, and 
productivity.  The need of that data for the evaluation has to be taken into account in the 
design and implementation of program.  
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